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The belief that a truly democratic people must have access to information
about governmental decision-making, coupled with our society's inherent dis-
trust of secrecy and closed-door government, has led to the passage of some
form of open-meeting law, or sunshine law, in nearly every jurisdiction in the
United States during the past two decades.1
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEw.
1. Frank A. Vickory, The Impact of Open-Meetings Legislation on Academic Free-
dom And The Business Of Higher Education, 24 Am. Bus. L.J. 427, 427 (1986).
These open meetings acts may be found at: AiA. CODE § 13A-14-2 (1992); ALAsKA
STAT. § 44.62.310-.312 (1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 to 431.09 (1985);
ARuc CODE ANN. § 25-19-106 (Michie 1992); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11120-11131
(West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-101 to 402 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-18a to 21k (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001-10005 (1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 286.0105-286.011 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1 to 50-14-6
(1990); HAw. REV. STAT. § 92-1 to 13 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-2340 to 2347 (1989);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 41-46 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN § 5-14-1.5-1
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Although the various state statutory grants in favor of open gov-
ernment are unique, there are many reoccurring themes and policy
rationales that can be deduced from an examination of these various
state statutes. Therefore, when faced with a potential open meetings
violation, attorneys would be well served to examine the broad spec-
trum of approaches that various states have employed regarding open
meetings acts and ensuing litigation.2
to 5-14-1.5-8 (Burns 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 21.1-.10 (West 1989); KAN STAT.
ANN. § 75-4317 to 4320 (1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.805-.850 (Baldwin
1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:4.1-:13 (West 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§ 401-410 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., State Gov't § 10-501 to 10-512 (1990); MASS.
GFE LAws ANN. ch. 30A § 11A-11A.5 (West 1992); MCH. CoMp. LAws. ANN.
§ 15.261- .275 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-
41-1 to -17 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010-.030 (Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-3-201 to 221 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 to -1414 (Cum. Supp.
1992); NEv. REv. STAT. § 241.010-.040 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A-1 to :8
(1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-6 to 21 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1 to -
4 (1993); N.Y. Pus. OFF. LAw § 101-111 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN STAT. § 143-
318.9 to .18 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 to -21 (1993); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 121.22 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 301-314 (1987); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 192.610-.710 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 271-286 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 42-46-1 to -13 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-10 to 110 (Law Co-op 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-25-1 to -5 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-101 to 106
(1988); T!EX. Rv. Cr. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311-314 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
340 to 346.1 (Michie 1987); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.30.010-.920 (West 1991);
W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1 to -7 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.81-.98 (West 1986); Wyo.
STAT. § 16-4-401 to 407 (1993). The federal government must also comply with
the Government In The Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. In the context of higher education the following articles will provide a general
overview. See e.g., Caroline Bensabat, Open Meetings In Higher Education - An
Analysis And A Proposal For Florida, 34 UNIv. FLORIDA L. REv. 250 (1982);
Harlan Cleveland, The Costs And Benefits Of Openness: Sunshine Laws And
Higher Education, 12 J.C. & U.L. 127 (1985); Jon Dilts, Open Meetings In Higher
Education, Corum. & L., June 1987, at 31. The Nebraska Public Meetings Law is
specifically addressed in the following articles: Leonard Jay Bartel, State Ex Rel.
Shuler v. Dunbar: The Nebraska Open Meetings Law, 15 CREiGHTON L. REv. 357
(1981); Kim M. Robak, Nebraska Unicameral Rule 3, Section 15: To Whom Must
The Door Be Open?, 64 NEB. L. REv. 282 (1985); Steven L. Willborn, Off The
Mark: The Nebraska Supreme Court And Judicial Nominating Commissions, 70
NEB. L. REv. 277 (1991); The Reporters Committee For Freedom Of The Press,
Tapping Officials' Secrets: A State Open Government Compendium - Nebraska
(Rebecca Daugherty ed. 1993); Meredith L. Oakes, Bridging The Gaps: The Ne-
braska Open Meetings Law, Masters Thesis Presented To The University of Ne-
braska Dec., 1989. Finally, the following articles will provide a survey of various
public meetings laws. W. Richard Fossey & Peggy Alayne Roston, Invalidation
As A Remedy For Violation Of Open Meeting Statutes: Is The Cure Worse Than
The Disease?, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 163 (1986); Eleanor Barry Knoth, The Virginia
Freedom Of Information Act: Inadequate Enforcement, 25 WILLIAm & MARY L.
REv. 487 (1984); John J. Watkins, Open Meetings Under The Arkansas Freedom
Of Information Act, 38 ARm L. REv. 268 (1984); Comment, Open Meeting Stat-
utes: The Press Fights For The "Right To Know", 75 HARv. L. REv. 1199 (1962);
Comment, The Personnel Matters Exception To The Mississippi Open Meetings
1994]
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This Note will first address the facts of the Nebraska Court of Ap-
peals decision in Meyer v. Board of Regents,3 and then generally dis-
cuss the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.4 At this point the specific
holdings of Meyer will be critiqued. The final Parts of this Note will
consist of two features. First, in order to assist practioners, the author
will suggest procedures for public entity negotiations that should
avoid most Nebraska Public Meetings Law violations. Second, the au-
thor will suggest that the holding in Meyer can best be explained by
the court's concern for the real world' consequences and dangerous
precedential value that would have been set if the court would have
invalidated the actions taken by the Board of Regents. In the final
analysis, such result-oriented decision making is criticized and the
Nebraska Legislature is invited to take appropriate corrective action.
Act - A Cloud Over The Sunshine Law, 7 Miss. COLLEGE L. REv. 181 (1987); Eu-
nice A- Eichelberger, Annotation, Construction And Application Of Exemptions,
Under 5 USCS Sec. 552b(c), To Open Meeting Requirement Of Sunshine Act, 82
A.L.R. Fed. 465 (1987); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Constitutes Personal
Matters Exempt From Disclosure By Invasion Of Privacy Exemption Under State
Freedom Of Information Act, 26 A.L.R.4th 666 (1983); Peter G. Guthrie, Annota-
tion, Validity, Construction, And Application Of Statutes Making Public Proceed-
ings Open To The Public, 38 A.L.R.3d 1070 (1971).
3. 510 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. App. 1993)
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1401 to 84-1414 (Reissue 1987, Cum. Supp. 1992 & Supp.
1993). Interpretations of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law may be found at:
Steenblock v. Elkhorn Township Bd., 245 Neb. 722, 515 N.W.2d 128, (1994); Otey
v. State, 240 Neb. 813, 485 N.W.2d 153 (1992); Marks v. Judicial Nominating
Comm., 236 Neb. 429, 461 N.W.2d 551 (1990); County of York v. Johnson, 230
Neb. 403, 432 N.W.2d 215 (1988); Stephens v. Board of Educ., 230 Neb. 38, 429
N.W.2d 722 (1988); Leibbrandt v. Lomax, 228 Neb. 552, 423 N.W.2d 453 (1988);
Aldridge v. School Dist., 225 Neb. 580, 407 N.W.2d 495 (1987); Tracy Corp. H v.
Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 218 Neb. 900, 360 N.W.2d 485 (1984); Nixon v.
Madison County Agric. Soc'y, 217 Neb. 37, 348 N.W.2d 119 (1984); Grein v. Board
Of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 343 N.W.2d 718 (1984); State ex rel. Schuler v. Dunbar,
214 Neb. 85, 333 N.W.2d 652 (1983); Simonds v. Board of Examiners, 213 Neb.
259, 329 N.W.2d 92 (1983); Lake v. Piper, Jaffray And Hopwood, Inc., 212 Neb.
570, 324 N.W.2d 660 (1982); State ex rel. Schuler v. Dunbar, 208 Neb. 69, 302
N.W.2d 674 (1981); Box Butte County v. State Bd. of Equalization, 206 Neb. 696,
295 N.W.2d 670 (1980); Banks v. Board of Educ., 202 Neb. 717, 277 N.W.2d 76
(1979); Pokorny v. City of Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334, 275 N.W.2d 281 (1979); Copple
v. City of Lincoln, 202 Neb. 152, 274 N.W.2d 520 (1979); Witt v. School Dist. No.
70, 202 Neb. 63, 273 N.W.2d 669 (1979); Alexander v. School Dist. No. 17, 197
Neb. 251, 248 N.W.2d 335 (1976); Chase v. Board of Trustees, 194 Neb. 688, 235
N.W.2d 223 (1975); South Maple St. Ass'n v. Board of Adjustment, 194 Neb. 118,
230 N.W.2d 471 (1975); State ex rel. Hansen v. Seiler, 193 Neb. 9,225 N.W.2d 388
(1975); Ford v. County of Perkins, 190 Neb. 304, 207 N.W.2d 694 (1973); Holden
v. City of Tecumseh, 188 Neb. 117, 195 N.W.2d 225 (1972); State ex rel. Medlin v.
Choat, 187 Neb. 689, 193 N.W.2d 739 (1972); Shadbolt v. County of Cherry, 185
Neb. 208, 174 N.W.2d 733 (1970); Johnson v. Nebraska Envtl Control Council, 2
Neb. App. 263 (1993); Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. App.
1993); Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Public Power District, 891 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir.
1989).
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I. FACTS-MEYER v. BOARD OF REGENTS
The plaintiff, Dan Meyer, a citizen and taxpayer, instituted this
action in Lancaster County District Court pursuant to the Nebraska
Public Meetings Law.5 The plaintiff alleged that the University of Ne-
braska Board of Regents violated the Public Meetings Law on the eve-
ning of July 31, 1989. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the Board: (1)
had impermissibly negotiated the resignation of University President
Dr. Ronald Roskens while in closed session; and (2) had likewise im-
permissibly negotiated with and selected as interim president, Dr.
Martin Massengale, in closed session at the "emergency" meeting of
the Board of Regents held on July 31, 1989.6
The controversy began on May 12, 1989 when the Board of Regents
declared a closed session to consider the evaluation of then President
Dr. Roskens.7 The Board had become concerned since Dr. Roskens
had expressed his intentions to leave the University of Nebraska.8 On
June 23, the Board again conducted a closed session and directed an
executive subcommittee to "convey the board's concerns to Dr. Ros-
kens and to try to reach a mutually beneficial agreement whereby Dr.
Reskens would vacate the office of president."9 Once again on July 21,
the Board convened in closed session, and directed the executive sub-
committee to request a:
definitive position from Dr. Roskens concerning his tenure in office and ... to
reach an agreement with Dr. Roskens in the following three week period ....
Dr. Roskens [informed the board he] would be unable to consider an agree-
ment as he was on his way to Japan for one week and then to Minnesota for a
two week vacation.1 0
On July 31, upon returning from Japan, Dr. Roskens presented a
proposal to vacate his office as president to the Board's executive sub-
committee."1 Regent Chairman Nancy Hoch felt that an agreement
seemed likely and ordered the Board's secretary to give notice of an
"emergency" meeting to occur that evening.12 At this "emergency"
meeting, the Board went into closed session to consider Dr. Roskens'
proposal.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to 84-1414 (Reissue 1987 & Supp. 1989).
6. 'he only relief appellant [Meyer] sought from the district court, other than at-
torney fees, was a declaration that the Board's actions were not in compliance
with the public meeting law." Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 457
(Neb. App. 1993). It is important to note the court's apparent aversion to the
appellants motivations in bringing this suit, and perhaps this explains the
court's willingness to expand the Nebraska Public Meetings Law. See discussion
infra Part III.
7. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Neb. App. 1993).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 453.
11. Id.
12. Id.
1994]
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In the closed session the executive subcommittee relayed Dr. Roskens' pro-
posal to the board, and the board then discussed the proposal at length. Nego-
tiations were carried on between the board meeting in closed session and Dr.
Roskens and his counsel.... The negotiations proceeded until the parties had
reached a preliminary understanding.
Once it became apparent during the negotiations that Dr. Roskens would
be vacating the office of president, the board felt it necessary to deal with the
questions of who would take over the immediate leadership of the university,
as they felt that continuity was 'critical'... University chancellor Martin Mas-
sengale was contacted, and after discussions and negotiations it was agreed
that he would take over as interim president.13
Needless to say, the secrecy surrounding Dr. Roskens' removal as
university president raised many eyebrows in the Nebraska Legisla-
ture14 and in the general community.' 5 In fact, over ninety-four per-
cent of the Nebraska populous felt that the financial terms of Dr.
Roskens' buyout were too generous.16
This public outcry prompted State Senator Ron Withem to request
Attorney General Robert Spire to investigate the procedures used by
the Board of Regents on July 31, 1989. Thereafter, Attorney General
Spire issued an opinion concluding that the university had complied
with the technical requirements of the Nebraska Public Meetings
Law.17
13. Id. at 453. Subsequently on August 23, 1989 the Board executed a written agree-
ment in conformance with the understandings reached on the evening of July 31,
1989. Further, on September 8, 1989, the Board ratified all of the agreements
that had arisen during the closed sessions on July 31, 1989. Id.
14. The Legislature's frustration with the Board of Regents was expressed in a 1991
amendment to the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.
The initial prompting of it would go back to the frustrations voiced to me
by members of my district who are constituents regarding the actions
taken by the board of regents and the Ronald Roskens incident. Nobody
knows what happened, why he was terminated, whatever. I think peo-
ple just wanted to know why they were spending a couple hundred thou-
sand dollars, not necessarily that they disagree with it, but they just
wanted to know why. And since we are spending their money, maybe we
should know.
COMrrrEE REcoRDs OF L.B. 288, 92D LEG., 1ST SESS. 1991, at 45.
15. Rogers Worthington, Secrecy in University Firing Fuels Anger, Cm. TRm., Oct.
26, 1989, at 39. The buyout of Dr. Roskens was likely to cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Cost of Buying out Roskens High, U.P.I. B.C. CYcLE Nov. 6,
1990.
16. Survey Shows Disagreement With Roskens' Ouster, U.P.I. B.C. CYcLE, Aug. 22,
1989.
17. 89063 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (1989). However, Attorney General Spire did scold the
Regents for their secretive behavior, notwithstanding any technical violation of
the law.
This accountability, so essential to responsible finctioning ofrepresenta-
tive government, transcends the limited legal obligations of the Open
Meetings Law and other statutes describing governmental procedures.
In other words, beyond the strict legal issue of Open Meetings Law com-
pliance, there is the larger issue of public accountability. Thus, although
[Vol. 73:456
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II. PUBLIC MEETINGS LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION
Before critically examining Meyer, it is necessary to examine the
historical interaction of institutions of higher education and state pub-
lic meetings legislation. The various public meetings laws now facili-
tate closer scrutiny of many activities within a university system.' 8
In this era of rising university budgets and corresponding revenue
shortfalls, legislators and the general public are demanding more
accountability and compelling justifications for university
expenditures.' 9
As a result, nearly half of the public universities in the country
have been involved in some form of public meetings litigation.20
Nearly all of this litigation has revolved around the fundamental pub-
lic meetings question: when may a public body go into closed or execu-
tive session?2 ' When drafting open meetings legislation, legislators
are attempting to balance the public's right to know against both orga-
nizational efficiency and matters of individual privacy which may
compel the use of a closed or executive session.22
not legally required, the concept of open and accountable government
suggests a fuller public explanation than that made by the Regents.
Id. at 1-2. The University received a similar scolding from present Attorney Gen-
eral Don Stenberg, regarding a subsequent charge of secrecy within university
subcommittee meetings. "'T]he fact that a particular meeting may be conducted
in secret is not the same as saying that the meeting should be conducted in se-
cret." 92020 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (1992).
18. Vickory, supra note 1, at 427. In fact, universities have been so inconvenienced
by public meetings requirements they are considering seeking special exemp-
tion's from their respective legislatures. Dilts, supra note 2, at 33.
19. Bensabat, supra note 2, at 252. "It is further argued that decisions which result
in the expenditure of public funds ought to be made openly so that the people can
see how their money is being spent; publicity of expenditures further serves to
deter misappropriations, conflicts of interest, and all other forms of official misbe-
havior." Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 164, 343 N.W.2d 718, 722-23
(1984). See also Ridenour v. Board of Educ., 314 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982)(holding open meetings to evaluate the local community college prdsident is
not an unjustified invasion of privacy).
20. Dilts, supra note 2, at 35.
21. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 136. 'The only obstacle to such openness in govern-
ment is the so-called executive session, for which members of the governmental
body can vote to exclude the press and public, usually while they debate the finer
points of a personnel or internal matter." Oakes, supra note 2, at 29 (referring to
Nebraska Law).
22. Some states require a two-thirds or even majority vote of the board members
before a body may go into closed session. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 137. In fact,
one state, Tennessee, has decided to always opt for openness and allows no closed
sessions. Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1976). Nebraska is unique in
that the public entity has broad discretion to go into closed session if it is deter-mined that a closed session would best serve the public interest. Cleveland,
supra note 2, at 139.
19941 461
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Many university administrators have argued that the costs of
openness are uniquely high in the university setting.23 Given this
viewpoint, it is not surprising to discover that universities are per-
ceived as the worst open meetings act offenders. 2 4
III. NEBRASKA PUBLIC MEETINGS LAW
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state that the formation of
public policy is public business and may not be conducted in secret.
Every meeting of a public body shall be open to the public in order that
citizens may exercise their democratic privilege of attending and speaking at
meetings of public bodies.
2 5
In Nebraska, the Public Meetings Law ensures that public policy is
formulated in the open, creating a commitment to openness that is
essential to the democratic process.2 6 The Nebraska Public Meetings
Law endorses the widely held view that free speech is largely mean-
ingless if the public is unable to obtain complete information about the
government's operations and activities.2 7
When called upon to interpret the Nebraska Public Meetings Law,
the Nebraska courts generally follow the universally accepted view
that "public meetings laws are [to be] broadly interpreted and liberally
23. It can be argued that public meetings laws have many negative effects on dis-
course within the university, such as loss of candor, loss of freedom of speech, and
overall, a more simplified administration and trivialized discourse. Additionally,
it is felt by some that the overall decision making process and evaluation proce-
dures are less effective. Cleveland, supra note 2 at 146-56. It is further sug-
gested that open meetings laws may unconstitutionally hinder academic freedom.
Bensabat, supra note 2, at 255.
24. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 144. "Board of Regents frequently attempt to conduct
their operations in secret, but almost invariably lose when there is a battle over
private meetings." Cleveland, supra note 2, at 145. It is interesting to note that
University of Nebraska testified against the adoption of any public meetings law
in Nebraska. CommrITEE RaCORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LE., 1ST SaSS., COMMTrEE
STATEmENT 1975. If this antagonistic atmosphere is maintained, more states
may opt for allowing removal from office as an additional open meetings act en-
forcement mechanism. Four states have already provided for this procedure.
Knoth, supra note 2, at 513-15.
25. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1408 (Reissue 1987). Additionally, Nebraska statutes pro-
vide that "[alll meetings of the Board of Regents shall be open to the public. The
board may hold closed sessions in accordance with sections 79-327, 84-1408 to
84-1414, and 85-104." NEB. REv. STAT. § 85-104 (Reissue 1987).
26. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm., 236 Neb. 429, 461 N.W.2d 551 (1990);
Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 343 N.W.2d 718 (1984).
27. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 130. In fact, it is possible to assert that open meet-
ings act violations infringe upon a citizen's First Amendment right not to be ex-
cluded from public forums. Rowe v. Brown, 599 A.2d 335 (Vt. 1991). 'he denial
of a public hearing in itself impaired the rights of the public." Menominee Cty.
Tax A. v. Menominee City Cl., 362 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). See
also David M. O'Brien, THE PuBLIc's RiGHT To KNow: THE SuPRamE CouRT AND
=a FiRsr AMENDMNT (1982).
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construed to obtain the objective of openness in favor of the public.
Provisions permitting closed sessions and exemptions from openness
of a meeting must be narrowly and strictly construed."28
Unfortunately for practioners and public officials, the Nebraska
Public Meetings Law jurisprudence resembles a complex maze. The
public body is constantly placed in the position whereby one misstep
can lead to complete invalidation of any formal action taken by the
board.29
From all this there evolves a guiding principle relatively simple and funda-
mental: If a public body is uncertain about the type of session to be conducted,
open or closed, bear in mind the policy of openness promoted by the Public
Meetings Laws and opt for a meeting in the presence of the public.
30
A. Emergency Meetings
Under Nebraska law a public body is required to give "reasonable
advance publicized notice" of its meetings, unless cause exists for an
emergency meeting.3 ' "Each public body shall give reasonable ad-
vance publicized notice of the time and place of each meeting.... Ex-
cept for items of an emergency nature, the agenda shall not be altered
later than twenty-four hours before the scheduled commencement of
the meeting..." 3 2 Though inadequately addressed by the Nebraska
courts,3 3 the Nebraska Attorney General has previously determined
that an "emergency", as defined within the context of the Nebraska
Public Meetings Law is a matter that "requires immediate
resolution."34
28. Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 164-65, 343 N.W.2d 718, 723 (1984);
Cleveland, supra note 2, at 132-33. Further, many states place a heavy burden
on the public body to prove its actions fit within an open meetings act exemption.
Booth Newspapers v. University of Mich., 481 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Eichelberger, supra note 2, at 474.
29. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1414 (Reissue 1987).
30. Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 168, 343 N.W.2d 718, 724 (1984). For the
most part this policy appears to be adhered to in Nebraska, as Nebraska is rated
as having the sixth most "open7 state government. Cleveland, supra note 2, at
164.
31. It somewhat unclear as to what is sufficient for reasonable advance notice.
Porkorny v. City of Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334,338,275 N.W.2d 281,284 (1979)(find-
ing twelve and one-half hours is not reasonable advance notice). But see Banks v.
Board of Educ., 202 Neb. 717, 722-23, 277 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1979)(finding two days
advance notice of school board meeting met requirements of Public Meetings
Law).
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1411. (Supp. 1993).
33. The Nebraska Supreme Court in dictum has suggested that courts should not
hold public entities to the "hyper-technical" notice requirements of the Nebraska
Public Meetings Law. Box Butte County v. State Bd. of Equalization, 206 Neb.
696, 703, 295 N.W.2d 670, 676 (1980).
34. "In general an item of an emergency nature is one which requires immediate
resolution by the appropriate body, which has arisen in circumstances impossible
1994]
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The legislative history of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law de-
fines "emergency" by reference to an example: The boiler at the local
school house needs to be repaired before the next school day, therefore
that evening the school board convenes an emergency meeting and au-
thorizes the necessary repairs.3 5 Clearly, Dr. Roskens' tenure and the
need for an interim president does not constitute an emergency simi-
lar to the foregoing example. It was not a matter that had "arisen
under circumstances impossible to anticipate,"3 6 or one which re-
quired "immediate resolution."3 7
This narrow interpretation of "emergency" has been endorsed in
other jurisdictions.38 These courts refused to broadly interpret "emer-
gency" so as to ensure that public bodies are not circumventing
the open meetings act and the people's right to free and open
government.3 9
Giving the Board of Regents every benefit of the doubt, there was
at most seven hours advance notice of the July 31, 1989 meeting.40
Therefore, according to the court of appeals, unless the meeting could
properly be classified as an emergency, the actions of the Board on
July 31, 1989, would be void for the lack of reasonable advance notice
pursuant to sections 84-1411 and 84-1414 of the Nebraska Statutes.4'
The Nebraska Court of Appeals held that given the circumstances
surrounding Dr. Roskens' tenure, there was an actual emergency on
July 31, 1989.42 The court of appeals reasoned that because of Dr.
to anticipate at a time sufficient to place it upon the agenda of the regular, called
or special meeting of the particular board." 75116 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (1975).
See also 92020 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (1992)(stating proper advance notice is essen-
tial in a democratic government); Carefree Imp. Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 649
P.2d 985, 992 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)("An 'emergency' is generally defined as an
unforeseen combination of circumstances which call for immediate action.").
35. CommirrEE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., 1ST SESS. 1975.
36. In fact, the Board admitted that concerns about Dr. Roskens' performance had
surfaced as early as May 12, 1989, as a result of which an executive subcommit-
tee had been trying to achieve a settlement with Dr. Roskens. See supra text
accompanying notes 7-10.
37. The record also reveals that the Board did not even reach an ultimate agreement
with all the parties involved until September 8, 1989. See supra note 13.
38. Carefree Imp. Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985 (Ariz. 1982); Town of Leb-
anon v. Wayland, 467 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1983).
39. Carefree Imp. Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985 (Ariz. 1982); Town of Leb-
anon v. Wayland, 467 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1983).
40. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 456 (Neb. App. 1993).
41. Id. at 456.
42. Because of Dr. Roskens' self imposed schedule, any further discussions
would have been put off until mid-August.... In less polite vocabulary
[the board] felt that there was a problem with Dr. Roskens' performance
and conduct and that he was evading them.... The Board was trying to
shoot a moving target, and on July 31, the target stood still. Therefore
argues appellee [regents], notice of the meeting was reasonable given the
exigencies of the situation. We agree.
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Roskens' "self-imposed schedule," an emergency existed when the Re-
gents felt that a mere possibility of agreement could be reached on
July 31, 1989.43 The plaintiff had argued that Dr. Roskens' vacation
schedule should not amount to a bona fide emergency under the Ne-
braska Public Meetings Law.44
Under the Nebraska Attorney General's definition of "emergency",
it appears that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the Ros-
kens' situation constituted an actual emergency.45 The Board had
been seeking Dr. Roskens' resignation for the past three months. This
clearly was not a matter that had arisen under "circumstances impos-
sible to anticipate" and that required "immediate resolution" by the
Board.46 The court's broad interpretation of "emergency" has created
an empty vessel which will allow almost any meeting to constitute an
emergency; hence no reasonable advance notice need be provided to
the public.
Further, the court of appeals' xeasoning ignores the employer-em-
ployee relationship that existed between the Board of Regents and Dr.
Roskens. An employee's vacation schedule should not constitute an
actual emergency for a public body under the Nebraska Public Meet-
ings Law. Faced with a similar instance, the Oregon Court of Appeals
concluded that as a general rule personal scheduling convenience will
not amount to an actual emergency within the public meetings law.47
"An actual emergency within the contemplation of the [public meet-
ings] statute, must be dictated by events and cannot be predicated
solely on the convenience or inconvenience of members of the gov-
erning body."48 Accordingly, the Nebraska Court of Appeals should
not have let something as trivial as an employee's vacation plans con-
stitute an emergency.
The Nebraska Public Meetings Law is a statutory commitment to
open government, but this commitment is largely meaningless if the
public is not given "reasonable advance notice" of government meet-
ings.49 The public's right to observe the formation of public policy is
severely infringed upon if there is no notice of upcoming meetings.5 0
Id.
43. Id.
44. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450 (Neb.
App. 1993)(No. A-91-942).
45. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
46. Carefree Imp. Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985 (Ariz. 1982); Town of Leb-
anon v. Wayland, 467 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1983).
47. Oregon Ass'n of Classified Employees v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist. 24J, 767 P.2d
1365, 1368 (Or. App. 1989). The court further noted that the school board has the
authority to direct staff to attend regular, special, and emergency meetings. Id.
48. Id.
49. 92020 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (1992).
50. Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 164-65, 343 N.W.2d 718, 723 (1984);
Cleveland, supra note 2, at 132-33. Further, many states place a heavy burden
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Given this legislative policy, the Nebraska Court of Appeals erred by
allowing an employee's vacation schedule to suffice for an actual emer-
gency under the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.51 Such a result is
even more distressing since it would appear that the Board of Regents
could have complied with the notice provisions of the Public Meetings
Law with little or no additional effort.5
2
Further, it is difficult to imagine how the appointment of Dr. Mas-
sengale as interim president constituted an actual emergency within
the meaning of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.53 The university
had already shown its ability to live without a "king for a day."
54 In
the unlikely event that an actual emergency arose, the Board had al-
ready demonstrated it had the ability to assemble and conduct busi-
ness in a very short time.55 In effect, the court allowed the Board to
create an emergency with respect to Dr. Massengale, simply by the
Board's removal of Dr. Roskens. One might ask, how far this chain of
self-created emergencies might go? Even assuming the Roskens' situ-
ation constituted an actual emergency, the court of appeals should
have required the Regents to provide reasonable advance notice before
the Board would consider further matters such as the need for an in-
terim president.5 6
In summary, the situation facing the Board of Regents may have
been pressing but it did not amount to an actual emergency under the
Nebraska Public Meetings Law.57 Even though it may have been
on the public body to prove its actions fit within an open meetings act exemption.
Booth Newspapers v. University of Mich., 481 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Eichelberger, supra note 2, at 474. See CommITTE. RECORDS OF L.B. 325,
84TH LEG., 1ST SESS. 1975.
51. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
52. The Board could have called a special meeting and given the required two days
reasonable advance notice. If Dr. Roskens refused to comply with the Regent's
request to attend such a meeting, it would seem that the Board would have had
further cause to terminate an insubordinate employee. This would be entirely
consistent with the Board's powers under section 85-106 which states "the Board
of Regents shall have power... (2) to elect a president... (3) to prescribe the
duties of such persons ... (8) to remove the president .... when the interests of
the University shall require it." NEB. REv. STAT. § 85-106 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
53. The Board argued that continuity was critical. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510
N.W.2d 450, 455 (Neb. App. 1993).
54. The parties agreed that during the summer Dr. Roskens was going to be in Japan
for one week, and at the time of the emergency meeting he was scheduled to
depart on a two week absence for a vacation in Minnesota.
55. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Neb. App. 1993).
56. In emergency meetings, discussion should be limited to only those matters which
require "immediate resolution." See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
In fact, section 84-1411 requires that "any formal action taken in such a[n] [emer-
gency] meeting shall pertain only to the emergency." NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1411
(Supp. 1993).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 35-56.
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bothersome, the Public Meetings Law required the Board to give rea-
sonable advance publicized notice to the citizens of Nebraska.5S
It should be noted that in Steenblock v. Elkhorn Township
Board,59 a decision subsequent to Meyer, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has given a definition of "emergency" in the context of the Ne-
braska Public Meetings Law. In Steenblock, the court defined emer-
gency as "any event or occasional combination of circumstances which
calls for immediate action or remedy; pressing necessity; exigency; a
sudden or unexpected happening; an unforeseen occurrence or condi-
tion."60 In Steenblock, the public entity claimed that an emergency
meeting was necessary to terminate the employment of a snow plow
contractor that the board felt was performing poorly. The court re-
jected the notion that this personnel matter constituted an actual
emergency.61 The court reasoned that the board's willingness to give
Steenblock "2 weeks' notice establishes that the meeting was not an
event that called for immediate action, nor was it an unforeseen occur-
rence or condition, since the reasons given for termination were based
upon past performance by Steenblock."62
Applying this new definition to the facts of Meyer, it becomes even
more clear that an emergency did not exist on July 31, 1989. The Ros-
kens' matter clearly was not an "unforeseen occurrence" or a "pressing
necessity." Further, since the parties did not reach a final settlement
agreement until September 8, 1989, the Steenblock court would ap-
pear to say that the lack of an emergency on July 31, 1989 is self-
evident.
B. Closed Sessions
This Note will next address the closed session decisions and delib-
erations that occurred on July 31, 1989. The Nebraska Public Meet-
ings Law allows a public body to go into closed session: (1) if it is
58. Since the court of appeals found that no Public Meetings Law violation occurred,
the court did not reach the Regents' argument that any Public Meetings Law
violation was cured at a September 8, 1989 meeting in which all of the actions
taken on July 31, were ratified. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court has pre-
viously recognized that a public entity may ratify an action that was taken at a
previous meeting that was not in compliance with the Public Meetings Law. Po-
korny v. City of Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334, 275 N.W.2d 281 (1979). In Pokorny, the
court held that the subsequent "good" meeting does not make up for the previous
"bad" meeting; however the court reasoned that the validity of any formal action
taken at the "good" meeting is not tainted by a previous "bad" meeting. Id. at
338. In essence, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the "bad" meeting and ask for
attorney's fees, but cannot seek to harness the public entities ultimate authority
to govern.
59. 245 Neb. 722, 515 N.W.2d 128 (1994).
60. Id. at 726, 515 N.W.2d at 130.
61. Id. at 726, 515 N.W.2d at 130-131.
62. Id.
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clearly necessary for the protection of the public interest, or (2) for the
prevention of needless injury to the reputation of an individual.6 3 The
legislative history of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law clearly indi-
cates that the closed session provisions were narrowly tailored and
were intended to apply in very limited circumstances. 64 Even though
the Nebraska statute provides no hard and fast rule for when a closed
session is permissible, it is clear that a bare recital of the statutory
exemption is insufficient given the public policy in favor of open
government.6
5
Above and beyond the two aforementioned general guidelines, the
Nebraska Public Meetings Law provides a non-exhaustive list of mat-
ters which generally will satisfy the criteria for closed sessions. Of
particular importance is section 84-1410, which provides an exemp-
tion for "evaluation of the job performance of a person when necessary
to prevent needless injury to the reputation of a person and if such
person has not requested an open hearing."66 This exemption is com-
monly referred to as the personnel matters exemption. In theory this
exemption protects the government employee's right to privacy, as
well as providing for efficient staff management for the governing
board.67 Despite these good intentions, many courts have struck
down a governing board's attempt to circumvent a public meetings law
under the guise of personnel matters.68 Given the legislative history
of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law, the Nebraska courts should
strictly construe the personnel matters exemption, in order to opt for
openness in government.
6 9
The strong presumption in favor of openness was recently reen-
forced by the Nebraska Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Nebraska Envi-
ronmental Control Council.70 According to the court in Johnson,
63. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
64. CommarrraE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., lST SESS. 1975, INTRODUCERS STATE-
bm~rr OF PURPOSE; Bartel, supra note 2, at 358; Oakes, supra note 2, at 45.
65. Meyer v. Board of Regents, No. A-91-942 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) (order on motion
for summary judgment); Oakes, supra note 2, at 123. E.g., Board of Trustees v.
Mississippi Publishers Corp., 478 So. 2d 269 (Miss. 1985).
66. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
67. "The public's right to know and to participate in the decision-making process fre-
quently comes into sharp conflict with the need for confidentiality in certain ar-
eas." Hokanson v. High Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 589 P.2d 907, 910 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978). See Watkins, supra note 2, at 314.
68. Migionico v. Birmingham News Co., 378 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1979); Dale v. Birming-
ham News. Co., 452 So. 2d 1321 (Ala. 1984); San Diego Union v. City Council, 196
Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1983); Hinds City Bd. of Sup'rs v. Common Cause, 551 So.
2d 107 (Miss. 1989); Board of Trustees v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 478 So. 2d
269 (Miss. 1985); McKay v. Board of Sup'rs, 730 P.2d 438 (Nev. 1986); Gannett
Satellite Info. Net. v. Board of Educ., 492 A.2d 703 (N.J. 1984); Guthrie, supra
note 2, at 1082.
69. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
70. 509 N.W.2d 21 (Neb. App. 1993).
[Vol. 73:456
PUBLIC MEETINGS LAW
"listening and exposing itself to facts, arguments and statements con-
stitutes a crucial part of a governmental body's decisionmaking."7 1
Before critically examining the closed sessions of the Board of Re-
gents, one must first take note of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law
"crystallization doctrine." The Nebraska Supreme Court has indi-
cated that if a decision has been crystallized in closed session, a mere
ceremonial acceptance in a subsequent open session will not cure the
Public Meetings Law violation.72 Thus, the doctrine provides that the
meeting shall be reconvened in open session before any formal action
may be taken.73 Therefore, the Nebraska courts are in line with the
generally held view that closed sessions allow board members to speak
freely on very limited issues, but a closed session may not be used to
reach agreements or determine public policy. 74
71. Id. at 31.
72. Aldridge v. School Dist., 225 Neb. 580, 582,407 N.W.2d 495,496 (1987)(recogniz-
ing that if the "real" decision with regard to the superintendent's employment
status was made in closed session, there is a Nebraska Public Meetings Law
violation).
The necessary inference is that the vote during the reconvened open ses-
sion was the extension, culmination, and product of the closed session.
To deny that deduction would not be a tax but a surtax on credibility,
and naivete to the nth degree. The prohibition against decisions or for-
mal action in a closed session also proscribes "crystallization of secret
decisions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance," and rubber-
stamping or reenacting by a pro forma vote any decision reached during
a closed session.
Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 167-68, 343 N.W.2d 718, 724 (1984). See
Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974). But see Karol v.
Board of Educ. Trustees, 593 P.2d 649, 652 (Ariz. 1979)("We do not believe, in
order to conduct a meeting openly, the public body need disclose every fact, the-
ory, or argument pro oruon raised in its deliberations, [in closed session] or every
detail of the recommended decision on which a vote is about to occur."); Hudspeth
v. Board of County Com'rs of Routt, 667 P.2d 775 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)(holding
that public meetings statute prohibits rubber stamping decisions previously
made in private, but permits review and deliberation of evidence in closed session
where no final action is taken); St. Aubin v. Ishpeming City Council, 494 N.W.2d
803 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)(holding informal canvas in closed session, by one mem-
ber of a public body to find out where the votes would be on a particular issue
does not violate the crystallization doctrine); Board of Trustees v. Cox Enter-
prises, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1984Xruling that board members may express
their opinions on an issue and announce how they expect to vote during the open
session).
73. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cum. Supp. 1992); Stephens v. Board of Educ., 230
Neb. 38, 41, 429 N.W.2d 722, 725 (1988). "For purposes of this section, formal
action shall mean a collective decision or a collective commitment or promise to
make a decision on any question, motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance
or formation of a position or policy." NEB. REy. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cune. Supp.
1992).
74. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 134; Watkins, supra note 2, at 303.
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1. Employee Buyout Arrangements
With this background, it is now appropriate to examine the closed
session surrounding the discussion of Dr. Roskens' status as univer-
sity president. The court of appeals accepted the university's argu-
ment that the evaluation of Dr. Roskens fit squarely within the
personnel matters exemption, on the basis that "public consideration
of Dr. Roskens' employment status might result in needless injury to
his reputation which would be unnecessary if he were to vacate his
office by agreement."75 The Board argued that the closed session to
"evaluate the president" was proper given Dr. Roskens' right to pri-
vacy.7 6 However, "not all 'personnel matters' may properly be dis-
cussed in closed session. Like the catchword 'budget,' the word
'personnel' is often too readily invoked to justify an arguabably im-
proper executive session."77 The personnel matters exception was not
intended to be an all-protecting shield for all discussions relating to
personnel; only those cases in which there is a significant threat to an
employee's reputational interests are exempted from public
scrutiny.78
Many courts have reasoned that given the clear legislative purpose
behind public meetings laws, a proper judicial construction "requires a
public body to make its decision in open meetings whenever possible
in keeping with the spirit of open meetings laws."79 It was clear that
there was no significant threat to Dr. Roskens' reputation and that
public interest weighed heavily in favor of a public meeting.8 0 Indeed,
one accepting the prestigious and highly compensated position of uni-
versity president can hardly expect to be shielded from public scrutiny
and candid job performance evaluations. 8 ' Under this standard, the
75. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Neb. App. 1993).
76. However, upon closer examination of the record, it appears that during the July
31, 1989 closed sessions Dr. Roskens' job performance was not even at issue.
Brief for Appellant at 13, Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. App.
1993XNo. A-91-942). It would appear, therefore, that this mere recital of a statu-
tory exemption should not withstand a public meetings challenge.
77. The Reporters Committee For Freedom of The Press, Tapping Officials'Secrets:A
State Open Government Compendium- Alaska 61 (Rebecca Daugherty ed.)(1993).
78. Dale v. Birmingham News Co., 452 So. 2d 1321 (Ala. 1984); Miglionico v. Bir-
mingham News Co., 378 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1979).
79. McKay v. Board of Sup'rs, 730 P.2d 438, 443 (Nev. 1986). See e.g., Dale v. Bir-
mingham News. Co., 452 So. 2d 1321 (Ala. 1984); Miglionico v. Birmingham
News Co., 378 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1979); San Diego Union v. City Council, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1983); Hinds Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs v. Common Cause, 551 So. 2d
107 (Miss. 1989); Board of Trustees v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 478 So. 2d
269 (Miss. 1985); Gannett Satellite Info. Net. v. Board of Educ., 492 A.2d 703
(N.J. 1984); Guthrie, supra note 2, at 1082.
80. See Cleveland, supra note 2, at 134; Watkins, supra note 2, at 303.
81. See e.g., McKay v. Board of Sup'rs, 730 P.2d 438 (Nev. 1986)(holding that termi-
nation of city manager could not be in closed session because character or reputa-
tion was not even an issue).
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Board of Regents could not justify a closed session to negotiate a set-
tlement agreement with Dr. Roskens. In fact, a governing body delib-
erating the wisdom of a buyout arrangement that may ultimately cost
the university more than $200,000, is exactly the type of public policy
decision that should not be made behind closed doors.82
The Nebraska Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the bal-
ance tips in favor of a closed meeting to evaluate the president of the
state's largest university.83 The public interest in education and uni-
versity governance8 4 clearly outweighs any harm that may have re-
sulted from an open and candid discussion and evaluation of Dr.
Roskens, especially since there appeared to be no threat of injury to
Dr. Roskens' reputation during the closed sessions on July 31, 1989.85
Given Nebraska precedent and the strong public policy in favor of
openness, the court of appeals was wrong to allow the deliberations
regarding Dr. Roskens' tenure on July 31, 1989 to be held in secret.8 6
It is of purely academic interest that neither the parties nor the
court discussed whether the Board's actions in closed session on July
31, 1989, violated the rule against crystallization. However, it is clear
from the record that public policy was formed during the closed ses-
sion and that the vote in open session regarding the Roskens buyout
amounted to no more than "ceremonial acceptance."8 7
2. Incidental Matters Rule
This Note next addresses the closed sessions dealing with Dr. Mas-
sengale's promotion to interim president. In order to justify the closed
session to appoint Dr. Massengale as interim president the statute re-
quires Board to show either (1) a substantial public interest, or (2)
82. "It is difficult to imagine a more critical time for public scrutiny of its governmen-
tal decision-making process than when the latter is determining how it shall
spend public funds." San Diego Union v. City Council, 196 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (Ct.
App. 1983).
83. Booth Newspapers v. University of Mich., 481 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
Contra Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 974 (Mont.
1984)("[C]losure of the [university presidents'] job performance evaluations
[meetings] was necessary to protect the individual privacy of the university presi-
dents and other university personnel.").
84. Booth Newspapers v. University of Mich., 481 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
85. See supra note 76.
86. Anyone believing that it was more salutary to spare the low bidder em-
barrassment over an honest mistake ignores that some people often
draw the most cruel conclusions from sinister silence. We believe the
slight discomfort, if any, experienced by a low bidder in the arena of pub-
lic lettings is far outweighed by the policy favoring openness in the meet-
ings of a public body.
Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 166, 343 N.W.2d 718, 724 (1984).
87. See Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450,453 (Neb. App. 1993); supra text
accompanying notes 72-74.
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that the desire to prevent needless injury to reputation required clo-
sure of the public meeting.8
8
When analyzing the first test, it is important to note that there is a
strong public interest when a university president is selected to over-
see the education of future generations.8 9 This strong public interest
led the Kentucky Attorney General to conclude that the Regents of
Morehead State University violated the open meetings law when they
held a closed session to discuss the selection process for a new univer-
sity president.9 0 By contrast, the Nebraska Board of Regents went
beyond mere discussions regarding the selection process for a replace-
ment president and actually conducted the selection process when
they awarded Dr. Massengale the position.
"Given the significant public interest in selecting Dr. Massengale
as Dr. Rosken's replacement, an interest at least as significant as the
$200,000 buy-out, the reasoning that applied to the buy-out applies
with equal force to Dr. Massengale's selection."91 Notwithstanding
the Board of Regents' position, there is no Public Meetings Law ex-
emption for the sensitive search for a new university president.9 2
Therefore, the Board failed to show that the public interest required a
closed session discussion regarding an interim president.
Under the second test, the Board could not justify the closed ses-
sion discussions on an interim president either as a personnel matter
or based on the need to prevent "needless injury to reputation."93 In a
situation analogous to the selection of a new university president,
courts have held that "the selection of a new school superintendent
was not in the same category as ordinary personnel matters, and la-
bels such as 'personnel' failed as a description of that subject."94 As
previously discussed, the personnel matters exemption should not be
used unless there is a reputational interest at stake.95 Such reputa-
tional interests are defined as "information of a personal nature where
88. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cure. Supp. 1992).
89. Vickory, supra note 2, at 445.
90. 83-489 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. (1983).
91. Brief for Appellant at 20, Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. App.
1993) (No. A-91-942).
92. Booth Newspapers v. University of Mich., 481 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
Contra The Minnesota Daily v. University of Minnesota, 432 N.W.2d 189 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988). In fact, some states exempt the search process for a new univer-
sity president from the open meetings law. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 153.
93. See supra text accompanying note 63.
94. Cox Enterprises v. Board of Trustees, 706 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. 1986). See also
Miglionico v. Birmingham News Co., 378 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1979)(holding city coun-
cil meeting to appoint board of education member must be open to public); Gan-
nett Satellite Info. Net. v. Board of Educ., 492 A.2d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1984)(holding closed meeting to interview candidates and to fill board vacancy is
illegal notwithstanding personnel exemption).
95. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of an individual's privacy."96 Indeed it is difficult
to imagine how the elevation of Dr. Massengale to interim president of
the University of Nebraska would cause any "needless injury to repu-
tation." Therefore, a straightforward application of the exemptions
that permit closed sessions under the Nebraska Public Meetings Law
would have invalidated the action the Board of Regents took regarding
Dr. Massengale.
In order to avoid finding for the plaintiff, the Nebraska Court of
Appeals resorted to some creative judicial interpretation. The court
determined that:
it was appropriate for the board to consider in closed session not only Dr. Ros-
kens' resignation, but also the immediate steps the board would take in re-
sponse to that action. The Board considered continuity of leadership at the
level of presidency to be critical. The issues were interrelated, and it was ap-
propriate that they be discussed together.
9 7
The court of appeals accepted the argument that since the discussion
surrounding Dr. Roskens' tenure was proper for closed session, it was
permissible for the Board to also discuss incidental topics, even if
these incidental matters standing alone would be an impermissible
subject matter of a closed session.98
This represents the first time that a Nebraska court has adopted
the incidental matters rule with regard to closed sessions.99 The inci-
dental matters rule allows a board to discuss collateral and germane
incidental matters to an exempt topic while still in closed session,
even if these incidental matters are not exempt from public scrutiny
under the public meetings law.100
96. Ridenour v. Board of Educ., 314 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). See also
Miglionico v. Birmingham News Co., 378 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1979)(defining reputa-
tion "as the estimate the public places on a person" including traits such as hon-
esty, loyalty and integrity); McKay v. Board of Sup'rs, 730 P.2d 438 (Nev.
1986)(defining threat to reputation as a serious assault upon one's good name,
such as alleged sexual misconduct).
97. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 455 (Neb. App. 1993).
98. Id.
99. The legislative history of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law clearly rejects the
notion of an "incidental matters rule."
The only change there is to make quite clear that in executive session
the public body should not go beyond those purposes which it went into
the executive session to discuss .... We're not changing that but we
wanted to make it extremely clear that it's limited to those purposes that
it actually went into the closed session for.
CommrrrEE RECORDS OF L.B. 43, 88TH LEG., IsT SEss. 1983, at 18 (emphasis ad-
ded). See also The Reporters Committee For Freedom Of The Press, Tapping
Officials' Secrets: A State Open Government Compendium - Alabama 34-35 (Re-
becca Daugherty ed. 1993)(stating it is improper for a court to read exemptions
into the public meetings law that were not adopted by the legislature).
100. Brief for Appellee at 27, Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. App.
1993) (No. A-91-942). See Gosnell v. Hogan, 534 N.E.2d 434 (1. App. Ct. 1989);
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The court of appeals erred in finding that the Board of Regents had
shown that discussions regarding the interim president were proper
for closed sessions. "The public body holding such a closed session
shall restrict its consideration of matters during the closed portions to
only those purposes set forth in the minutes as the reason for the
closed session."10' Therefore, it would appear that a plain reading of
this statute would dictate that the Board of Regents violated the Pub-
lic Meetings Law by selecting and negotiating with Dr. Massengale to
assume the role of interim president, during the closed session which
was originally called to evaluate the status of then-President Dr.
Roskens.102
As previously mentioned, drawing the line between open and
closed sessions is one of the fundamental questions of open meetings
jurisprudence.10 3 Practical experience shows that even when a public
body has gone into closed session, the difficult issue of when to re-open
must still be addressed.104 One must ask whether a board chairman
or legal counsel can reasonably be expected to insure that every word
spoken during a closed session is on a topic exempt from public
discourse.' 05
Regardless of such real world considerations, the court of appeals
was wrong to accept the incidental matters rule into Nebraska Public
Meetings Law jurisprudence.' 0 6 It is now permissible for a public
body to hide in closed session a non-exempt topic as long as the board
can say that the non-exempt topic is incidental to an exempt topic.
Kansas v. Board of Educ., 764 P.2d 459 (Kan. 1988)("Discussion, in executive ses-
sion of board of education, of matters relating to employment of superintendent
properly encompassed goals of superintendent's office, even though the latter
matters were not enumerated in exceptions to Open Meetings Law.").
101. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cum. Supp. 1992). "Almost invariably executive ses-
sions are limited in scope to discussion of the particular topics for which they
have been closed." Cleveland, supra note 2, at 137.
102. The board may then go into executive session to discuss this one matter and,
when concluded, must re-open the meeting. No other matter may be discussed at
the executive session than the announced subject." Hinds Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs v.
Common Cause, 551 So. 2d 107, 111 (Miss. 1989).
103. See supra note 22.
104. "We realize that it may be difficult to draw the line and separate such discussion
in executive session, respecting "character or good name" from general discus-
sions respecting personnel matters." Miglionico v. Birmingham News Co., 378
So. 2d 677, 682 (Ala. 1979). In fact, section 84-1410 provides a procedure for an
individual board member who feels that the closed session is no longer authorized
to request a re-opening of the meeting when the discussion turns to improper
matters or topics that were not stated as the original justification for the closed
session. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
105. See COaIrTTE REcoRDs L.B. 288, 92D LEG., 1sT SEss. 1991, at 56; Cleveland,
supra note 2.
106. See e.g., The Minnesota Daily v. University of Minnesota, 432 N.W.2d 189 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988)([Jludicially created exceptions [to the scope of open meetings law]
are generally not permitted.").
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Such a rule is contrary to the clear legislative policy that "the forma-
tion of public policy is public business and may not be conducted in
secret."'0 7 The rule has the potential to greatly reduce the openness
of government in Nebraska.
Other courts have recognized that the personnel matters exemp-
tion was narrowly tailored to protect the privacy interests of individ-
ual employees and have refused to accept an incidental matters
defense.l 0 8 These courts appreciate the danger of institutions using
the incidental matters rule to hide discussions, that should be held in
public, behind the mask of the personnel matters exemption.l 0 9 Pub-
lic entities have attempted to close discussions ranging from salary
expenditures to any discussions which related to the work environ-
ment under the guise that such discussions were incidental to person-
nel matters.110 As a matter of fundamental statutory construction as
well as legislative policy, it was improper for the court to attach or
apply the incidental matters rule to the personnel matters
exception."
The incidental matters rule serves only to expand the topics which
may be discussed in a closed session. 112 In fact, by definition such a
rule allows for closed session discussion of non-exempt topics." 3
Given the strong public policy the Legislature has announced through
the Public Meetings Law, the Nebraska judiciary should not provide
more exemptions for public bodies, only in the name of convenience.114
107. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1408 (Reissue 1987).
108. Hinds County Bd. of Sup'rs v. Common Cause, 551 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1989); Gan-
nett Satellite v. Board of Educ., 534 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio 1988).
109. Hinds County Bd. of Sup'rs v. Common Cause, 551 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1989); Gan-
nett Satellite v. Board of Educ., 534 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio 1988). Some courts place
the burden on the public body to segregate exempt from non-exempt discussions,
and require that all non-exempt discussions be held in public if at all practicable.
E.g., Philadelphia Newspapers v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 727 F.2d 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 617 F. Supp.
825 (D.D.C. 1985).
110. San Diego Union v. City Council, 196 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1983); Board of Trustees v.
Miss. Publishers Corp., 478 So. 2d 269 (Miss. 1985); Gannett Satellite v. Board of
Educ., 534 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio 1983).
111. See Gannett Satellite v. Board of Educ., 534 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio 1988); Eichel-
berger, supra note 2, at 475-77.
112. It is not for the courts to expand the legislature's definition ofpersonnel matters.
See San Diego Union v. City Council, 196 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1983).
113. See supra text accompanying note 100.
114. [A] statute will not be extended to include situations by implication
when its language is specific and not subject to reasonable doubt. In the
construction of statutes, implications which in effect are necessarily con-
trary to or incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the enactment
being construed will not be judged in.
SuTHRLAND STAT. CONST. § 55.03 (4th Ed. 1984)(footnotes omitted). See City of
Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Comp. Court, 133 Neb. 225, 231, 274 N.W. 576,
580 (1937). See also State Dep't of Roads v. Melcher, 240 Neb. 592, 483 N.W.2d
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Once again, the court's failure to address the issue of crystalliza-
tion is perplexing. The Board readily admits that in closed session the
following public policy was formed: The university should have an in-
terim president, who should be Dr. Massengale, and whose terms and
conditions of status as interim president and chancellor were agreed
upon."15
In short, the Board of Regents determined that the University of
Nebraska could not survive without a president for two days. The
Board then selected the interim president behind closed doors.116 In
hindsight, one can speculate that if the Board had taken the time to
call a special meeting with regard to Dr. Roskens' replacement and
conduct an open dialogue, the university would have been better
off.117
IV. RETROSPECTIVE ON NEGOTIATIONS
In order to assist practioners, the author will now suggest a proce-
dural alternative that, if it had been utilized, would have ensured no
Public Meetings Law violation would have occurred.
At this point it is important to revisit the crystallization doctrine
implicitly underlying the decision in this case. In a nutshell, a public
body violates the Nebraska Public Meetings Law if a collective deci-
sion is reached by the entire board in closed session. However, there is
Nebraska precedent that suggests if a public body can properly work
its way through the "negotiations maze," Public Meetings Law viola-
tions may be avoided."1
8
There is nothing in the INebraska Public Meetings Law] that requires negoti-
ations for the purchase of land to be conducted at open meetings, but delibera-
tions of the council as to whether an offer to purchase should be made is an
action that should be taken at an open meeting.11 9
In Pokorny, the Nebraska Supreme Court appeared to recognize that
in many situations public discourse may be harmful to the negotia-
tions process and, therefore, may adversely affect the public interest
as a whole.120 In such a case, it appears that the Nebraska Public
Meetings Law does not require public discourse during the entire ne-
540 (1992)("[W]hen statutory language is plain and unambiguous, no judicial in-
terpretation is needed.").
115. See supra note 13.
116. Meyer v. Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Neb. App. 1993).
117. It is possible that the selection of Dr. Massengale as permanent president (even
though he was not a search committee finalist) would have raised fewer concerns
if Dr. Massengale's original promotion to interim president would have been
made in open session. Withem Says Regents Destroyed Trust, U.P.I. B.C. CYCLE
Nov. 23, 1990.
118. Porkomy v. City of Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334, 275 N.W.2d 281 (1979).
119. Id. at 339, 275 N.W.2d at 284.
120. Id.
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gotiations process. Imagine the advantage a party contracting with a
public body would have if the public entity was required to openly dis-
close all of its positions, bottom lines, and overall strategy.
What this would have meant for the Board of Regents is largely a
matter of speculation. However, it could be argued that part of the
negotiations with Dr. Roskens and Dr. Massengale necessitated pri-
vate discussions and closed sessions. In the present situation, the
Board erred in continuing the entire negotiations process as a complete
board in closed session, thereby illegally crystallizing policy decisions
behind closed doors. If, however, on July 31, 1989, the Board would
have remained in open session and voted on Dr. Roskens' proposal as
submitted, there would have been no Public Meetings Law violations.
If the Board felt that Dr. Rskens' initial proposal was insufficient, it
could have openly rejected it and then directed its representatives to
try again. Such a procedure would have preserved the opportunity for
public comment and open deliberations regarding the wisdom of such
a proposal.121
Even though this recommendation may appear to be form over sub-
stance, there is some authority supporting this procedure.122 In fact,
such a procedure would ensure the opportunity for public discourse on
the proposed agreement. Yet, some of the face to face negotiations
could still maintain a degree of privacy.123
V. REAL WORLD POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS
Up to this point, this Note has examined how the Nebraska Court
of Appeals erred as a matter of judicial construction in interpretation
121. However, it is uncertain if such a public disclosure would have led to the best
settlement agreement for the citizens tax dollars. See infra text accompanying
note 132.
122. The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously recognized that many times public
meetings litigation does amount to form over substance. Porkomy v. City of
Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334, 339, 275 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1979). Nevertheless, even a
technical violation of the Public Meetings Law will entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Id.
123. Where the Board of Regents erred was in trying to conduct negotiations as an
entire board in closed session. However, in 1994 the Legislature amended the
Public Meetings Law in an attempt to address some of these concerns by allowing
closed sessions to "include negotiating guidance given by members of the public
body to legal counsel or other negotiators in closed sessions authorized under sub-
division (1)(a) of this section." L.B. 621, 93d Leg., 2d Sess. 1994 (codified at NEn.
REv. STAT. §§ 84-1410, 84-1414 (Cam. Supp. 1994)). Whether the board can re-
main in closed session while negotiations are ongoing, and eventually come to an
agreement while still in closed session is unclear. In effect, the courts will have to
determine when the line between "negotiating guidance" and illegal crystalliza-
tion of public policy is crossed.
1994]
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of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.124 Upon a closer reading of
Meyer, it appears that the Nebraska Court of Appeals strayed away
from a strict judicial construction of the Nebraska Public Meetings
Law, in light of some real world compliance problems such a strict
construction would have created.
An examination of the legislative history of the Nebraska Public
Meetings Law reveals that the Legislature did not intend to unduly
harness public bodies.125 The Legislature realized it would be very
difficult for the local school board member or village council member to
understand the technical requirements of the Public Meetings Law.126
Most public bodies consist of people who are not paid at all for their efforts;
they are volunteers to their communities, to their school districts, or to their
political subdivisions, being paid almost nothing for their hard work, and it's
quite a burden to have to accept the danger of liability of this nature.
12 7
It is possible that in light of these concerns the Nebraska Court of
Appeals refused to hold the Board of Regents, and consequently all
public bodies within the state, to a strict judicial interpretation of
emergency under the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.128
The legislative history of the closed session provisions of the Ne-
braska Public Meetings Law reveals the Legislature's deep concern
that if the ability to go into closed session was too restricted, the ac-
tual discussions would be pushed even farther into the back room.129
Indeed, there appears to be an inverse relationship between the re-
strictiveness of the provisions on closed sessions and the sum total of
open government. 130 "[P]ublic officials are prone to waste time mak-
ing speeches for the benefit of an audience, while in closed meetings
they 'are less on their dignity, less inclined to oratory.'-131 It has even
been suggested that by prohibiting a public body from going into
closed session, the public receives in return thoughtless actions and
policies.132
Attorneys that frequently represent public entities argue that
much of the discussions that occur in closed sessions are protected by
124. See supra Part IlH.
125. COmmrTrEE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., IST SESS. 1975, INTRODUCERS
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.
126. Many times these smaller community boards will not even have an attorney pres-
ent at the board meeting. COmmInrEE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., 1ST SaSS.
1975, at 2; CoMMrrTEE RECORDS OF L.B. 43, 88TH LEG., IST SEaSs. 1983, at 43.
127. Oakes, supra note 2, at 61 (addressing potential for criminal penalties under the
Nebraska Public Meeting Law).
128. See 92020 Op. Neb. Atty Gen. (1992)(defining item of emerging nature). But see
Steenblock v. Elkhorn Township Bd., 245 Neb. 722, 515 N.W.2d 128 (1994).
129. COMTTEuE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., 1sT SEss. 1975, at 3.
130. Oakes, supra note 2, at 47.
131. Comment, Open Meetings Statutes: The Press Fights For The Right To Know, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1962)(footnote omitted).
132. Oakes, supra note 2, at 64.
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the attorney-client privilege.13 3 They claim that a closed session can
effectively be used to "clear the air," and a better overall decision mak-
ing process is the end result.13 4 It appears that the Nebraska Court of
Appeals was receptive to these practical concerns when it examined
the closed sessions that were used to negotiate with Dr. Roskens and
Dr. Massengale.'35
It is important to remember that the Nebraska Public Meetings
Law allows a citizen to invalidate action of a public body that was not
in complete compliance with the law.'3 6 This possibility of invalida-
tion may have provided an additional reason for the Nebraska Court
of Appeals to read flexibility into the Nebraska Public Meetings
Law.137
The finality of governmental action is questioned any time an open meeting
violation is alleged. No one can rely on challenged legislation until a court
rules on whether a violation occurred. Further, invalidation permits special
interest groups to veto popular legislation for purely private motives. Invali-
dation of governmental decisions under such circumstances undermines the
political process.... Invalidation has been used to challenge a broad range of
substantive action. Collective bargaining agreements, decisions to consolidate
educational institutions, personnel actions, zoning ordinances, and a host of
other important government decisions have been attacked on the grounds that
public officials violated sunshine statutes somewhere in the decision-making
process.1 3 8
This blatant thwarting of the governmental process leads one to ques-
tion whether a public meetings law is more trouble than it is worth.
In fact, when the Nebraska Public Meetings Law was first debated,
many opponents argued that as long as the final decisions of a public
body were made public, the ballot box will provide all of the public
accountability that is necessary.139
Despite these real world concerns, it was improper for the court of
appeals to expand the definition of "emergency" and "personnel mat-
ters" to approve the Board of Regents' actions under the Nebraska
Public Meetings Law.
133. COMEM=rE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84Ta LEG., IST SEas. 1975, at 31; Guthrie,
supra note 2, at 1080.
134. COMMIE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., 1sT SEss. 1975, at 31.
135. The legislative history of the Nebraska Public Meetings Law also reveals that the
Legislature was warned that as a practical matter it is impossible to have a
closed session without the discussion of incidental matters. COMMTTEE RECORDS
L.B. 288, 92D LEG. IST SESS. 1991, at 53-56.
136. NE. REv. STAT. § 84-1414 (Reissue 1987).
137. Even though invalidation was not sought by the plaintiff in Meyer, the court was
still cognizant of the fact that a contrary holding may lead to future invalidation
of a wide range of governmental decisions.
138. Fossey & Roston, supra note 2, at 165, 168-69 (footnotes omitted). See also Guth-
rie, supra note 2, at 1086.
139. CoinaTi'rF RECORDS OF L.B. 43, 88TH LEG., isT SEss. 1983, at 28, 66. See also
Tolar v. School Bd. of Liberty County, 398 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fa. 1981)(declining to
invalidate school board action which violated Sunshine Law).
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In passing, we would note that the trial court's holding created an exception to
the Public Meetings Act for the sensitive search for a president of the Univer-
sity of Michigan. While it may be that the exceptions in our statute should be
broadened to permit closed sessions under such circumstances, we consider
that to be a legislative matter better decided within the framework of the leg-
islative process.
1 4 0
Meyer is a call to the Legislature to reform the Nebraska Public Meet-
ings Law. The real world compliance problems existing in the Ne-
braska Public Meetings Law should be addressed by the Nebraska
Legislature.141
VI. SOLUTION
The Nebraska Legislature has several options to consider when
clarifying the Nebraska Public Meetings Law. First, it could tighten
up the exemptions under the Public Meetings Law, either by com-
pletely eliminating closed sessions or attempting to make the current
exemptions more restrictive. Second, on a somewhat smaller scale,
the Legislature could simply clarify how public entities may conduct
negotiations in compliance with the Nebraska Public Meetings Law.
Alternatively, the Legislature could add a substantial compliance142
140. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. University of Mich., 481 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Mich. App.
1992).
The board also made policy arguments to the effect that the assurance of
anonymity of the applicants was of crucial importance.... Notwith-
standing the absence of any express exception in the [public meetings
law] covering the precise situation involved, the board would have this
court impose limitations on public access to the interviews by application
of a "rule of reason." . . . The legislature has not amended the statute,
and we deem it inappropriate to engraft by judicial fiat a change the
legislature has apparently chosen not to make.
Dale v. Birmingham News Co., 452 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Ala. 1984). See also Hinds
County Bd. Of Sup'rs v. Common Cause, 551 So. 2d 107, 111 (Miss. 1989)(noting
that it is not for the court to consider the wisdom of a narrow personnel matters
exemption).
141. See Kometscher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 308, 128 N.W.2d 781, 787 (1964)(explain-
ing that it is not province of court to provide interpretation which legislature
might have adopted); Board of Trustees v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 86,
89 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)(finding that difficulty of enforcement is not a proper
canon for statutory interpretation of a public meetings law).
142. In Meyer, the court held that "while we find no substantial violation here, we do
find that this pronouncement of opting for openness is worth stating." Meyer v.
Board of Regents, 510 N.W.2d 450,458 (Neb. App. 1993). It is uncertain whether
the reference to "substantial" compliance was a mere oversight by the court of
appeals. Section 84-1414 provides three levels of review when addressing public
meetings law violations. If the plaintiff challenges the board action within 120
days of the alleged violation any technical violation will result in invalidation of
the board's action, from 120 days to one year a "substantial violation" is neces-
sary before invalidation, and after one year no action for invalidation can be
brought. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1414 (Cum. Supp. 1992). In Meyer, the plaintiff
challenged the Regents' action within 120 days, hence strict compliance was re-
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and/or a substantial reconsideration provision that would still main-
tain the principle of open government, yet make the statute more
workable.143
Other legislatures have provided provisions for a good faith/sub-
stantial compliance defense to an alleged public meetings law viola-
tion.144 In these states, in order to prevail the plaintiff must show
more than a mere technical violation of the public meetings law.145
"The fact that violations carry misdemeanor penalties acts as a deter-
rent to public officials who, by virtue of their positions, are particu-
larly sensitive to the risk of criminal prosecution."'146 Still other
states will allow a public body the unlimited use of closed sessions as
long as there is substantial reconsideration at a public meeting before
any formal action is taken.147 Further, some states allow a subse-
quent ratification at a public meeting to cure any previous public
meetings law violations.148
Arguably, the substantial reconsideration test may be the best al-
ternative for the Nebraska Legislature. Such a procedure would allow
public bodies the unlimited use of closed sessions. The current law is
riddled with too many technical requirements and truly has turned
into form over substance. However, a provision for substantial recon-
sideration ensures that the public still is informed. Such a provision
is also likely to lead to a better overall decisionmaking process.' 49
Ultimately, it is for the Legislature to determine which change
should be made. However, the opinion in Meyer illustrates how a
strict statute may not be strictly followed.
quired and not the "substantial violation" standard which was apparently uti-
lized by the court of appeals.
143. See COMMITTEE RECORDS OF L.B. 325, 84TH LEG., IsT SEss. 1975, INTRODUCER'S
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.
144. See Karol v. Board of Educ. Trustees, 593 P.2d 649 (Ariz. 1979)(analyzing ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-431.01 to .09); Carefree Improvement Ass'n v. City of
Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Fossey & Roston, supra note 2, at
169. In fact, the Nebraska Legislature has previously been urged to adopt a com-
plete substantial compliance defense. CorXvrrss. RECORDS OF L.B. 43, 88TH
LEG., IsT SEss. 1983, at 42.
145. See Hokanson v. High Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 589 P.2d 907, 911 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979).
146. Fossey & Roston, supra note 2, at 173.
147. See, e.g., Brookwood Area Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Anchorage, 702 P.2d 1317
(Alaska 1985); Board of Trustees v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984); Fossey & Roston, supra note 2, at 173.
148. Guthrie, supra note 2, at 1089. The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously
endorsed a similar procedure via a nunc pro tunc amendment to a public entities
minutes. State ex rel. Schuler v. Dunbar, 214 Neb. 85, 333 N.W.2d 652 (1983).
149. See supra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Nebraska Public Meetings Law is intended to en-
sure citizen's access to the governmental process. Unfortunately, the
University of Nebraska Board of Regents seems to be following the
nationwide trend of resistance and hostility toward open governance
that is prevalent in academia.15o
Perhaps more distressing is that the Nebraska Court of Appeals
allowed the Board of Regents to create an emergency in order to limit
the notice provided to the public regarding the status of the president
of the University of Nebraska. Contrary to judicial doctrine and prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation, the court of appeals stretched the
Nebraska Public Meetings Law statutory exemptions, even recogniz-
ing a new incidental matters rule, in order to hold that the Board of
Regents had acted within the law.
It is clear that under a proper reading of the applicable statutes as
they existed, the Board of Regents violated the Nebraska Public Meet-
ings Law on the night of July 31, 1989. Rather than forcing courts to
expand the Nebraska Public Meetings Law in order to maintain a real
world compliance perspective, the Nebraska Legislature should
amend the Public Meetings Law, either by removing the invalidation
provisions or providing a defense for substantial compliance with the
Public Meetings Law requirements. Perhaps the Legislature should
go so far as allowing for unlimited closed sessions, so long as there is
substantial reconsideration at an open meeting before any final action
is taken.
Finally, public bodies can greatly simplify matters for themselves
if they will remember this guiding principle: Opt for openness.
R.J. Shortridge '95
150. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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